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j. Introduction 
The distribution system in the Federal Republic of Germany has undergone 
considerable structural changes during the last fourty years. Therefore trade 
issues such as drawing the "right" boderline between wholesaling and retailing, 
opening hours in retailing, the location of cash & carry markets, and the 
survival of small retail businesses have called forth much debate and litigation. 
However, in most cases such discussions lack an adequate theoretical frame-
work that could separate out efficiency effects from other criteria. 
The design of the channels of trade can be interpreted as a problem of 
economic organization. From an economic perspective, such problems must be 
analyzed in efficiency terms. The application of transaction cost analysis may 
be of assistance in analyzing the causes of the structural changes and in under-
standing the economic consequences involved. Trade may then be explained as 
an endeavor which seeks to minimize transaction costs. And structural change 
in the distribution system should then be regarded as response to changes in 
transaction costs. 
It is the purpose of this paper to develop a framework for such an analysis 
and to illustrate its fruitfulness by the example of some particular provisions of 
the German Unfair Competition Law that attempt to regulate certain trade 
activities. 
First, the application of the transaction cost analysis to distribution and 
trade will be introduced. Then, factors influencing the level of transaction costs 
in distribution systems are identified. Changes in these factors can be seen as 
relevant causes of structural change in distribution. Furthermore, factors which 
restrict an efficiency-oriented adaptation to change must be considered; many 
of these restrictions can be traced back to transaction costs created by the legal 
system. The overall transaction cost analysis would, therefore, be incomplete 
without reviewing the impact of the legal system on the emergence of certain 
types of transaction costs which tend to preserve existing structures within the 
distribution system. For West Germany, one major source of such transaction 
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costs is the Law on Unfair Competition. The further analysis will focus on this 
set oflegal rules and will concentrate mainly on two new articles (6a and 6b) 
introduced into the law in 1969. The amendment aimed at improving consumer 
protection, but in fact created barriers for wholesalers who wished to enter into 
retail activities and even imposed restrictions upon certain types of wholesaling. 
Besides these restrictions there are some further legal impediments in German 
law which heighten transaction costs for any unconventional new type of trade 
that may economize on transaction costs but does not fit into the traditional 
regulated pattern. 
2. Trade as an Activity which Minimizes Transaction Costs 
The following short outline of a transaction cost approach to distribution is 
based mainly on general transaction cost theory (COASE [1937], WILLIAMSON 
[1975], [1979], [1985], BOSSMANN [1982], PICOT [1982], MICHAELIS [1985]), but 
also takes into account applications of that theory to marketing and distribu-
tion (CARMAN [1980], WILLIAMSON [1979 a], GOLDBERG [1983], GUMBEL [1985], 
PICOT [1986], and ANDERSON and WEITZ [1976]). 
The total costs of any economic activity can be divided into two interacting 
subclasses: production costs and transaction costs. Transaction costs imply all 
the resources that have to be sacrificed in order to arrive at a mutually accept-
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able agreement for the exchange of goods or services between two or more 
parties, They comprise, e.g., four different types of costs: (1) contact costs 
(search of information), (2) contracting costs (negotiation, formulation of con-
tract), (3) monitoring costs (checking of quality, quantity, prices, deadlines, 
secrecy), (4) adaptation costs (changes during the validity of agreement). Of 
course, given their character as opportunity costs, the level of some of them 
may vary depending upon the economic actors involved. 
In the case of direct distribution from producer to consumer, the following 
cost structure emerges (Figure 1). It is assumed that unit costs can be adequate-
ly calculated, that profit can be neglected and that no relevant production costs 
arise on the consumer's side. Thus, total costs impinging on a consumer consist 
of production costs, producer's transaction costs and consumer's transaction 
costs. 
It seems obvious that the level of transaction costs offers an incentive to 
creative entrepreneurial activity, especially if that level becomes prohibitive. In 
addition to other measures (e.g. information and advertising, internal sales 
organization, consumer associations) trade is one possible and frequently ob-
served way to reduce transaction costs in distribution. 
In an efficient trade channel, the total of transaction costs of producers, 
traders, and consumers and of production costs of traders does not exceed the 
total of transaction costs of producers and consumers without trade (Figure 2). 
Thus, traders may be defined as specialized agents selling services which reduce 
the transaction costs of producers and/or consumers. They substitute for activi-
ties which previously had to be carried out by producers or consumers. Both 
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producers and consumers are willing to engage in trade if the opportunity costs 
of their own activities are greater than the price of the traders' services. Of 
course, transaction costs can only be identified for particular types of mutual 
agreements (e.g. depending on the products involved). According to the special 
characteristics of a transaction type, different forms of distribution and trade 
will emerge. 
3. Determinants of Transaction Costs in the Distribution System 
Factors influencing transaction costs will change traders' opportunity sets and 
will also lead to structural changes in the distribution system. These factors 
alter the efficient form of division of labor between producers, traders, and 
consumers, but also within the trade industry itself (e.g. relation between retail-
ing and wholesaling). The knowledge of these factors and of their actual devel-
opment helps to explicate changes in distribution and trade, and it is necessary 
to maintain the system's efficiency. 
The following five factors 
- specificity of demand, 
- number of producers and consumers, 
- coordination between production and demand, 
- communication between producer and consumer, 
- joint demand for goods 
are discussed in a "ceteris paribus"-fashion. Actual trends shaping the signifi-
cance of each factor are briefly mentioned. In order to assess distributional 
trends for one kind of good the influences exerted by all the determinants have 
to be summarized. 
3.1 Specificity of Demand 
The more consumer-specific a producer's output, the less opportunity for trade 
exists. The specific relation between producer and consumer calls for direct 
contact in order to define, evaluate and monitor the exchange in question. 
Transaction costs are high, but because of the specificity of the exchange they 
can hardly be reduced by an independent trader as a third party; his investment 
in very specific economic relations could not be recovered elsewhere. 
Specific, non-standardized goods represent a remarkable proportion of ac-
tivity in the distribution of economic performance (craft activities, construc-
tion, building, special mashinery, services of medical doctors, lawyers, consult-
ing finns). Independent trade has no role to play in this area, and it is generally 
recognized that this situation tends more towards integration than towards 
disintegration (e.g. KLEIN, CRAWFORD and ALCHIAN [1978], WILLlAMSON 
[1979], ALCHIAN [1984]). Under these circumstances, general consulting and 
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accepted norms (e.g. standards, law) may help in economizing the transaction 
costs of specific economic relations, but not trade in its classic sense. 
However, the reverse is important: the more standardized and non-specific 
an economic good, the more room there is for trade as a form of distribution 
which reduces transaction costs. A trader's investment in the transaction pro-
cess of standardized products can be applied on various occasions. Thus, trade 
always presupposes a certain degree of non-specificity and standardization, for 
otherwise it cannot function as a superior economic institution. 
The production of standardized goods can be observed to increase as tech-
nical development advances (e.g. consumer electronics, software, household 
appliances, house construction). As a result, changes in the distribution of the 
output of these sectors (more involvement of general trade) must be taken into 
account, whereas new technical developments are elaborated in specific appli-
cations and economic relations without trade (e.g. in biotechnology). 
3.2 Number of Producers and Consumers 
In small numbers situations (WILLIAMSON [1975]) there is no room for free 
trade. The bargaining in a bilateral monopoly can perhaps be moderated and 
accelerated by a third party, but it cannot be economized by an independent 
trader who buys and sells the merchandise. The problem of profit distribution 
would even become more difficult, and costs would rise. 
If there is a larger number of producers and consumers for a particular type 
of good, trade comes into play. Contacting costs can now be reduced by the 
intervention of traders (BALIGH and RICHARTZ [1964, 1967], GUMBEL [1985]). 
If In producers and n consumers desire to make contact with each other without 
trade, m . n contacts are necessary. If one trader is involved, the number of 
necessary contacts is reduced to In + n, which points to relevant economies in 
transaction costs for consumers and producers. The larger the number of 
producers and consumers, the more important becomes the role of trade (num-
ber of traders, wholesaling, retailing). 
In some industries (e.g. consumer electronics, automobile, oil) the number of 
producers is decreasing, so the number and relevance of independent trade 
institutions also is diminishing. From a transaction cost economics view, there 
is no need for wholesaling if few producers are able to communicate directly 
with some retail organizations or even directly with consumers. 
Furthermore, efficient and inexpensive transportation facilities tend to re-
duce contact costs of consumers and to favor the emergence of a small number 
of centralized trade locations with high economic peformance compared to a 
large number of decentralized, scattered retail outlets in a situation with expen-
sive transport. 
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3.3 Coordination Between Production and Demand 
The more closely schedules of production and consumption can be coordi-
nated, i.e. with low transaction costs, the less opportunity there is for trade (e.g. 
in case of flexible order production). Due to technological or economic reasons, 
production is very often unable to adapt to spontaneous demand. Transaction 
costs of marketing rise. Trade can economize on this potential cost by spe-
cializing in collecting and stocking goods from various producers and holding 
them available to meet a varying demand. 
However, as new production technology tends to make industrial production 
more flexible than before ("lot quantity = 1 "), the opportunity for trade will be 
reduced. 
3.4 Communication Between Producer and Consumer 
The higher the communciation barriers between producer and consumer are 
the more important is the role' of trade as a communicator which reduces 
transaction costs. Communication problems in distribution can emerge because 
of long distances, incompatible codes and languages, lack of trust, lack of 
expertise, or high opportunity cost of communicating with producer/consumer. 
Thus, transaction costs of arriving at an agreement may be high, sometimes 
even prohibitive. Trade can function as a communication specialist in distribu-
tion (translator, messenger, independent third party, economies of scale for 
investments into language and know-how problems), thereby reducing transac-
tion costs. This economic function of trade is very old and can best be illustrat-
ed by international distribution. 
However, there are some important forces that tend to decrease the commu-
nication function of trade. Facilities for the supply and exchange of informa-
tion have improved tremendously during the last decades. In many cases, 
information "built into" the products (brand, advertising) can reach the cus-
tomer without mediation by trade. Public information and education of the 
consumer facilitates resolution of problems with information, evaluation and 
comparison (e.g. support by TV, magazines, school, consumer consulting, new 
data bases and technical information services). The continuously improving 
worldwide infrastructure of telecommunications allows for the ever more rapid 
and direct exchange of information between producers and selected traders or 
even with the consumer. Bypassing of traditional trade institutions can be seen 
to occur because their information and communication function, especially in 
connection with standardized goods, is less and less needed. New media and 
services tend to replace these functions, thereby economizing consumers' trans-
action costs. On basis of public information then, consumers choose those 
outlets that guarantee the cheapest supply of the goods. Of course, these outlets 
are in many cases not the traditional small trade businesses, but efficiently 
organized, large-scale traders at central locations. 
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3.5 Joint Demandfor Goods 
In order to resolve their problems, many consumers demand a set of hetero-
geneous goods at one time (e.g. various groceries and household goods). Nor-
mally, producers are unable or unwilling to supply a major subset of that 
bundle (lack of know-how and of economies of scope). If trade specialized in 
a very narrow range of products, transaction costs for those consumers with 
joint demand would exhibit a striking increase (multiple transactions for one 
act of problem-solving). Stocking a well assorted wide range of goods may 
therefore be a trading strategy that minimizes costs (shopping centers, cash and 
carry markets, department stores, supermarkets) that can be handled only by 
large trade-businesses (economies of scale). 
As transportation costs tend to be low, such large-scale trade outlets will 
typically be found at the outskirts of cities, where land is not so expensive and 
traffic can flow. When combined with improved information facilities, this 
factor leads to concentration in trade. 
4. Consequences: Changing Structure of Trade and Distribution 
The above picture of developments in trade is somewhat onesided. In addition 
to the forces that lead to a declining role for decentralized, scattered trade 
outlets and to increased concentration, there are also some developments that 
work in the other direction. In particular, new complex products, products with 
regional or local attraction, products with less standardized characteristics and 
high demand in personal consulting, and products with rapidly changing fea-
tures or with high prestige value are distributed by specialized and often small 
trade outlets (e.g. new goods for sports and leisure, fashion, goods for new 
minorities such as ecological products, jewelry). 
However, one major characteristic of the development is that contact be-
tween producers and consumers is possible to a higher degree today than it was 
in the past. Physical distribution and product information, therefore, may be 
separated. Physical distribution has to serve two functions for the consumer: 
to minimize costs of contacting and contracting, and to assemble without 
friction that choice of goods which fits into the preference pattern of a given 
class of consumers. 
The determinants discussed in the preceding section have affected the tradi-
tional pattern of branches in trade: wholesaling as the intermediary between 
producers and retailers has declined; retailing and resale trade have been 
subject to a remarkable concentration process, especially in grocery and the 
supply of goods for household demand. Thus, many small retailers and whole-
salers have not been able to adapt to the changes in these determinants by 
transforming their businesses into highly specialized or large-scale trade organi-
zations. Traditional barriers between wholesale and retail have become ob-
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solete, because transaction costs may be saved if a trader serves a specific class 
of customers which has similar demand patterns (e.g. the demand group of 
large families, small restaurants, small service businesses). It is not sensible to 
distinguish within such a class of customers as to the criterion for what purpose 
(private or business) the products are purchased. 
5. Strategic Options and Institutional Restrictions 
Thus, the change of transactional determinants calls for a strategic reorienta-
tion of the trade firms involved. It is mainly traditional wholesalers and tradi-
tional small retailers and resalers that are affected. To the extent that, in the 
long run, the structural change ensures the existence of one trade step in the 
distribution channel (which is often but not always the case, see e.g. the trend 
to direct marketing in some industries due to the above determinants) the 
following strategic requirements emerge: 
- for retailers, direct access to producers based on their good contacts to con-
sumers as their special strength; 
- for wholesalers, direct access to all kinds of consumers based on their good 
contacts to producers as their special strength. 
Only ifthere is equal opportunity of strategic development in both directions 
can an unbiased competition between all groups involved take place. This, 
however, is not the case in West Germany. 
It is worth while for many of the actors affected, especially for the large 
number of retailers, to invest in defending their old position so as to eliminate 
the potential competition from wholesalers. They may attempt to do so by 
adding transaction costs to the activities of their actual and potential competi-
tors with superior cost structures. To achieve that goal, they may invest in 
lobbying and thus create new legal or administrative restrictions upon their 
competitors. Or they may seek to have existing statutes interpreted in such a 
way by the courts that they function as sources of transaction cost for their 
competitors. Typical devices in this context involve the seeking of injunctions 
against the activities of their competitors. 
In the Federal Republic of Germany, legal devices have played an important 
role as means of imposing restrictions on new forms of competition and new 
types of activities in the distribution system. Unfair competition law, the regu-
lation of opening hours in retailing, legal restrictions on the location of cash & 
carry markets, according to their wholesale or resale function, are examples of 
such devices. 
Institutional restrictions of this type may prevent or slow down the process 
of structural change in the distribution system. On the other hand, there are 
strategic options open to those actors who are interested in new forms of 
competition and new types of trade activities. Because restrictions are imposed 
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by the legal system, these options are either directed at changing those restric-
tions by means of legislation or interpretation of existing statutes or at adjust-
ing to those restrictions without major changes in the cost situtation. The latter 
option for adjustment depends on the importance of barriers to exit created by 
legal restrictions such as zoning laws. Whether such strategies are successful or 
not depends on other characteristics of the legal system as well. Therefore, it is 
necessary to analyze the economic impact of the relevant statutes and their 
interpretation by courts. The example of unfair competition law will help to 
illustrate the interdependence between the legal system and the strategic options 
open to various actors. 
6. Unfair Competition Law and Transaction Costs 
6.1 Economic Functioning of Unfair Competition Law 
Unfair competition law refers to certain trade practices which are viewed either 
as unfair or as deceptive; competitors, trade associations, and consumer protec-
tion associations are granted injunctive relief against such activities under 
certain conditions. Those activities therefore become less attractive as parame-
ters applied in the process of competition. Outlawing them may lead to saving 
in transaction costs, because the costs of finding out optimal trade opportuni-
ties may be reduced. On the other hand, unfair competition law may even 
prohibit useful trade practices which lead to intensified competition if competi-
tors are free to use unfair competition law as a tool to defend themselves against 
efficient newcomers. In such a case, the potential for reduced transaction costs 
introduced by efficient newcomers cannot be realized. This ambivalent nature 
of unfair competition law makes it impossible to assess its economic impact in 
general, rather, the impact of different unfair competition law clauses in saving 
or increasing transaction cost must be individually analyzed. And even in a case 
in which transaction cost savings are to be expected, the fact that the operation 
of the legal system itself is not free of cost must be taken into account. The 
creation and the application of unfair competition law may be regarded as 
constituting transaction costs for the distribution system. 
6.2 The Economic Rationale of Prohibiting Deceptive Trade Practices 
To be able to study the economic rationale of those clauses of unfair competi-
tion law which prohibit deceptive trade practices, the function, which is served 
by the dissemination of information in the distribution system must be consid-
ered (AKERLOF [1970], DARBY and !URNI [1973], NELSON [1970], NELSON 
[1976], SCHOEPPE and CZERWONKA [1980], THORELLl and ENGLEDOW [1980], 
and LEHMANN [1981]). 
Start with a hypothetical situation in which producers convey the relevant 
product information to consumers directly and consumers search for the trade 
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outlets where they may buy products at lowest cost. Information about optimal 
buying opportunities may either be provided for potential customers by traders 
or may be generated by buyers themselves. If traders do not supply any infor-
mation, buyers may - instead of searching themselves - acquire information 
about trade opportunities from specialized agencies or firms in the market. The 
emergence of such intermediaries may be explained in the same way as has been 
the emergence of trade as a separate activity interposed between production 
and consumption. Buyers will invest in generating or acquiring information 
about purchase opportunities up to the point at which the benefits derived from 
better information are equal to the costs of acquiring it. 
The situation is changed if traders disseminate information to potential 
buyers with respect to purchasing opportunities. They may try to improve their 
individual position - i.e. to increase their turnover - by providing false or 
deceptive information to buyers. Such information is of no value to buyers and 
may even subject them to loss, because buyers who follow such deceptive 
statements will not realize the optimal purchase opportunity. Their welfare loss 
may be calculated as the difference between the actual purchase price they had 
to pay and the purchase price which they would have had to pay if purchasing 
at their optimal trade outlet. This is merely the simple argument that incorrect 
information leads to suboptimal economic decisions. But the difficulty in such 
calculation stems from the fact that finding out the optimal trade outlet would 
incur costs; it might well be questionable whether the loss suffered by choosing 
the suboptimal trade outlet as a consequence of erroneous information from 
traders would exceed the additional cost from searching for the optimal trade 
outlet. Therefore, the argument that deceptive information automatically leads 
to a welfare loss of consumers may be too simple and does not hold. Never-
theless, this argument usually serves as a premise of conventional wisdom in the 
theory of unfair competition law. Clauses protecting consumers against false 
and deceptive statements are viewed as economically useful because they safe-
guard consumers' interests in not making incorrect purchasing decisions. This 
line of argument works with the implicit assumption that, given correct infor-
mation, buyers would be able to make optimal purchase decisions and that 
correct information is the alternative to incorrect information. But if a trader 
must not disseminate deceptive informations, why should he provide a poten-
tial customer with true information; why should he not just abstain from 
providing information at all and leaving the search activities to the buyer? To 
find the optimal purchase opportunity, buyers must invest in such activities. So, 
if the economic impact of the clauses of unfair competition law which prohibit 
deceptive information are to be assessed, the situation in which false statements 
are possible and the situation in which traders are free either to provide true 
information or no information at all must be compared. The easiest way to do 
so is to look into the transaction costs implied. 
72 Christian Kirchner and Arnold Picot JlTI'IT1E 
6.3 Transaction Cost Analysis of Clauses Prohibiting Deceptive Trade Practices 
If traders provide information to buyers, and if they are free to use this device 
for profit maximizing purposes, potential buyers must take into account the 
possibility of opportunistic behavior. They must be careful to act according to 
the messages transferred to them by that information. They may either disre-
gard it and attempt to generate the necessary information themselves, or buy 
relevant information from specialized agencies or firms. If they want to make 
use of information provided by traders, they must invest in testing such infor-
mation. If such testing is more economical than the two other options, buyers 
will invest in undertaking it. That investment may be regarded as a new type 
of transaction cost because - given the uncertain status of the information 
provided by the traders - testing becomes a useful activity in the contacting 
phase. 
The rationale of outlawing deceptive trade practices by unfair competition 
law may then be explained as follows: if such legal devices are effective, they 
may eliminate those transaction cost incurred by the necessity for buyers to 
test traders' information. Given the three options open to buyers to ascertain 
the optimal purchasing opportunity, eliminating testing costs means that the 
information given to buyers by traders becomes less expensive. There are cases 
in which buyers will choose this option and thus save transaction costs. If 
traders refrain from disseminating information to buyers, unfair competition 
law has no impact on consumers' welfare. If traders provide such information, 
and buyers need not test it they are better off. Therefore, the conclusion may 
be drawn that the provisions in unfair competition law clauses which prohibit 
deceptive information are transaction cost-saving devices. 
6.4 Transaction Costs Caused by the Legal System 
In order to make traders refrain from applying deceptive trade practices, it is 
necessary to devise legal provisions and to enforce them. The more detailed the 
case law applicable to all the varieties of potential misuses of dissemination of 
information, the better the chance that traders are cautious not to act in such 
a manner that a law court may grant an injunction against that activity. The 
development of such a refined case law is very costly, and it might therefore be 
questioned whether the benefits derived from that case law are worth the 
investment in the legal system. This argument must be taken seriously if a 
longer period of time is under review, and if the overall savings in transaction 
costs during this period are compared to costs incurred by the legal system. But 
suppose it is assumed that investment into the creation of applicable case law 
has been undertaken in the past, and that we are interested in the present 
situation; if it is then asked whether there are transaction cost savings caused 
by the existence of the particular provision of the unfair competition law, the 
investment into the legal system must be regarded as sunk cost which does not 
have to be taken into account. In a static model, therefore, the functioning of 
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the legal system - as far as the application of unfair competition law to decep-
tive trade practices is concerned - may be viewed as virtually cost-free. But in 
a dynamic model this assumption no longer holds. That is to say, in periods of 
rapid structural change, in which competitors attempt to use devices drawn 
from unfair competition law as a weapon against efficient newcomers, and in 
which these newcomers may make use of new and unusual parameters in the 
process of competition, the cost of the legal system may be considerable. This 
insight into the transaction cost economics of the legal system leads to a not 
overly optimistic view of the economic benefits derived from unfair competition 
law clauses prohibiting deceptive trade practices. Clearly, these provisions may 
have a transaction cost-saving effect. But such advantages may well be out-
weighed by the transaction costs of the legal system. Even then, however, it has 
to be taken into account that, in the phase following upon such a period of 
rapid change, investment into the legal system during the preceding period may 
again be classified as sunk cost. The overall conclusion - which would have to 
be tested empirically - is that prohibiting deceptive trade practices by unfair 
competition law may lead to savings in transaction costs in the distribution 
system. 
7. Sec. 6a and 6b Unfair Competition Act 
7.1 Background 
Prior to 1969, Sec. 3 of the German Unfair Competition Act (Gesetz gegen den 
unlauteren Wettbewerb - UWG) of June 7th 1909 which refers to false and 
deceptive statements, had been used by retailers as a device to attempt to 
confine wholesalers to what was called "truly functional wholesale trade" 
(funktionsechter GroBhandel, see, e.g. MESTMACKER [1984J, pp. 285-288; 
LEHMANN [1978]; FEZER [1976], pp. 708-710) and to prevent cash and carry 
wholesalers from doing business with private consumers (SCHRICKER and 
LEHMANN [1976], pp. 73-84). But German law courts refrained from inter-
preting Sec. 3 UWG, so as to prevent per se wholesalers doing business with 
private buyers (Decision of the Bundesgerichtshof of Dec. 9th 1964, "Wickel", 
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [1965], pp. 748-753). The economic argu-
ment used to convert Sec. 3 UWG into a tool for protecting retailers against 
competition from new traders engaging in wholesale and retail trade as well, 
and thus conserving traditional trade structures within the Genuan distribution 
system (for the historical development of this structure see GRONER and 
KOHLER [1986], pp. 21-24), was very simple: anyone who engages in trade 
activities with private consumers and purports to be a wholesaler conveys a 
certain message to those private consumers: it is that his prices are lower than 
those of retailers because retailers have to purchase their merchandise from 
wholesalers and thus have a comparably unfavorable cost situation. This mess-
age must be deceptive - so the argument the lobbying retailers' associations 
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argued - because any trader who does business with private consumers has to 
calculate precisely as does a retailer and cannot offer goods at lower prices than 
his competitors in the retail trade. But even if there should be cost savings, they 
would not accrue to the private consumers but merely lead to higher profits 
(KRIEGER [1968]). To sum up this position: any statement by a wholesaler who 
conducts business with a private consumer that he is a wholesaler must be 
deceptive per se. 
A very similar line of argument has been developed in regard to purchases 
by private consumers from producers or wholesalers which are carried out on 
the basis of so-called purchase certificates (Kaufscheine) distributed by retailers 
or specialists dealing in such purchase certificates (SCHRICKER and LEHMANN 
[1976], pp. 85-99). The argument was that such purchases could not be carried 
out at better conditions than purchases from retailers. The distribution and use 
of purchase certificates would automatically convey the message to the private 
consumer that he could save by not purchasing from the retailer. Hence, it was 
concluded, this message must be deceptive. 
The difficulty of applying Sec. 3 UWG to the trade practices mentioned was 
that German law courts were willing to grant injunctive relief to competitors or 
trade associations by outlawing such activities - consumer protection associa-
tions never sued for an injunction in such cases - only when deception of 
consumers had been clearly proven. Theoretical arguments like those outlined 
above were not regarded by the courts as sufficient. 
7.2 Introduction of Sec. 6a and 6b UWG 
At that stage, the German legislator - spurred on by retailers' associations and 
a spirit of consumer protection - overcame these 'difficulties' of applying 
Sec. 3 UWG to the trade practices mentioned and introduced two new provi-
sions to the Unfair Competition Act: Sec.6a and 6b (FRERICHS [1967], 
KRIEGER [1968], MULLER and SCHOLZ [1968], PIEPENBROCK [1970]). 
In Sec. 6a par. 2 UWG injunctive relief is granted to competitors, trade 
associations, and consumer protection associations against wholesalers who 
engage in business with private consumers and make statements pointing to the 
wholesale character of the business (BAUMBACH and HEFERMEHL [1983], 
§ 6a UWG, note 1). The provision does not require actual deception but 
prohibits this kind of activity per se. There are limited exceptions to that rule 
which do not play a role in the application of the provision, because the 
wholesaler engaging in trade with private consumers has to carry the burden of 
proof if he refers to these exceptions. 
In Sec. 6 b UWG the distribution and sue of purchase certificates - as de-
scribed above - is prohibited. Competitors, trade associations and consumer 
protection associations have the right to sue for an injunction against such 
activities. An exception is only made in cases where the certificate is confined 
to one single purchase and where it may be only used once (BAuMBAcH and 
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HEFERMEHL [1983], § 6 b, note 2). In practice, this exception is not of major 
importance. As was the case in Sec.6a par. 2 UWG, the provision of 
Sec. 6 b UWG does not require actual deception of consumers to have occurred 
but prohibits per se the issue and use of purchase certificates. 
7.3 General Impact 
At the first glance, it might be thought that such very specialized provisions 
of the German Unfair Competition Act would have no or only a minor im-
pact upon structural change within the distribution system. Compared to 
Sec. 3 UWG, both provisions appear to be very similar, and seem to be pure 
consumer protection devices safeguarding consumers against undue deception 
and consequently against suboptimal purchase decisions. Furthermore, it could 
be thought, the costs incurred by the operation of the legal system are probably 
very low because both provisions introduce per se rules which are easier to 
handle and less open to argument than Sec. 3 UWG. But on the other hand it 
must be realized that, as per se rule, these provisions also cover cases in which 
there is no deception of consumers. In addition, they outlaw trade activities 
which otherwise would help to break down traditional barriers between whole-
sale and retail trade. They therefore tend to conserve traditional trade struc-
tures, even if they should prove to be less efficient than new ones. The argument 
that application of these provisions is very cheap because of the per se character 
of the norms has meanwhile proven to be incorrect, because both provisions 
have become battlefields on which retailers' associations attempt to restrict still 
further the business practices of cash and carry wholesalers. (SCHRICKER and 
LEHMANN [1976], pp. 116-130, 150-154; GRONER and KOHLER [1986], 
pp. 70-126). In light of these doubts as to the actual economic impact of 
Sec. 6 a and 6 b UWG it might be useful to apply transaction cost analysis to 
these provisions (KIRCHNER [1976]). 
7.4 Transaction Cost Analysis of Sec. 6 a UWG 
Sec. 6 a par. 2 UWG grants an injunction to competitors, trade associations, 
and consumer protection associations if a wholesaler engages in direct business 
with private consumers and purports to act as a wholesaler. There could be 
cases in which consumers are deceived by being induced to believe that they are 
being offered exceptional conditions but in reality are buying at normal or even 
at less favorable conditions than from retailers. In such cases Sec. 6a par. UWG 
may lead to transaction cost savings. The line of argument would be identical 
to that for Sec. 3 UWG, which has been discussed above. But - as has been 
stated - Sec. 6 a par. 2 UWG is a per se rule and prohibits statements pointing 
to the wholesale character of the business even in such cases where customers 
are well aware of the real price-saving opportunities. Due to the presently 
prevailing interpretation of Sec. 6 a par. 2 UWG, any statement as to the whole-
sale character of the trader falls under the provision (BAUMBACH and 
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HEFERMEHL [1983], §6a note 7), so that in effect it covers any sale to a private 
consumer by a wholesaler. The threat of an injunction against such activities 
functions as an effective tool to eliminate such trade practices. The fact that the 
wholesaler has to carry the burden of proof if he desires to make use of one of 
the very narrowly designed exceptions in Sec. 6 a UWG means in effect that 
these exceptions have no practical significance. They are law on the books, not 
law in action. 
The direct effect of Sec. 6 a par. 2 UWG, therefore, is that wholesalers cannot 
do business with private consumers. They must confine their sales to commer-
cial buyers. i.e. producers, retailers, and large institutional buyers such as 
hospitals. 
If a wholesaler were free to do business with any type of customer, and if it 
were sensible not to distinguish between different types of buyers, the restric-
tion inherent in Art. 6 a UWG has a double effect: it prevents those wholesalers 
from realizing their optimal opportunities in distribution, thus maintaining 
transaction costs in the distributions system at a higher level than necessary. 
And those buyers who would save by purchasing from such wholesalers must 
invest additional resources into searching for what is now the second best 
source for their purchases. Transaction costs of the distribution system would 
be increased by both effects. 
7.5 Transaction Cost Analysis of Sec. 6 b UWG 
Sec. 6b UWG prohibits the issue and the use of purchase certificates which 
enable private consumers to buy directly from the producer or the wholesaler. 
This provision has a quite similar effect to that of Sec. 6 a par. 2 UWG. As far 
as cases of consumer deception are concerned, there might be some benefits 
deriving from such a provision. But as this section is a per se rule as well, there 
are cases in which the consumer is well aware of the cost saving opportunity 
offered to him by this system. To outlaw the possibility of purchasing goods at 
the cheapest available source means additional transaction costs for whole-
salers and consumers. 
7.6 The Economic Rationalefor Strictly Separating Wholesalingfrom Retailing 
The above-mentioned increase in transaction costs within the distribution sys-
tem because of the introduction of Sec. 6a and 6b UWG would not exist if the 
arguments of the proponents of these provisions are valid: any wholesaler who 
does business with private consumers automaticalfy loses his cost advantage as 
a wholesaler and has to calculate like a retailer. Even if there should be some 
cost advantage remaining, this would not be passed onto the customer but 
would raise the trader's profit. 
The first part of this argument cannot be defended in the light of modern 
developments in the distribution system, as has been shown above. There are 
opportunities for cost savings in the distribution system which are due to 
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changed conditions on the production side and on the consumption side. If the 
trading function is increasingly confIned - at least in many business sectors -
to simply offering a large choice of goods, and minimizing distribution costs by 
not offering extra services to the customers, it would make no sense at all to 
distinguish between different types of buyers and to discriminate against one 
class of customers. Therefore, the idea that in present-day circumstances, 
"superior" cost functions are the results of restricting trading to 'truly func-
tional wholesaling' is anachronistic. 
Neither is the second part of the argument of the proponents of Sec. 6 a and 
6 b UWG valid. The idea that actual cost advantages of traders would not be 
passed onto customers but lead to rising profIts works with the implicit assump-
tion that those traders hold a monopoly position. If they have competitors who 
possess similar cost functions and the same option of doing business with all 
types of customers, such monopoly profIts would very soon be eliminated. In 
the light of the fIerce competitions in the cash and carry wholesale trade in 
Germany, the assumption of a monopoly position of wholesalers who engage 
in business with private consumers is totally unrealistic. 
The proponents of the introduction of Sec. 6 b UWG have refIned the argu-
ment that wholesale and retail trade should be strictly separated for the case in 
which the private customer obtains access to the wholesaler by means of a 
purchase certifIcate (KRIEGER [1968], p. 517): there cannot be any cost saving, 
it is argued, but - on the contrary - there are additional costs, because the agent 
who hands out purchase certifIcates seeks to make a profIt as well. But if we 
examine the transaction costs of such tripartite purchases where the private 
consumer gets a purchase certifIcate from the retailer and then buys directly 
from the wholesaler, the typical transaction costs of the distribution have 
merely been re-arranged. The wholesaler takes on certain new activities - e.g. 
contracting - and the customer takes on new activities, e.g. transport. The 
retailer gets a kind of commission fee for bringing together buyer and seller. If 
the private consumer has free access to the wholesaler, this commission fee 
represents the search costs for fInding the optimal source for his purchases. But 
if private consumers have no free access to wholesalers and the use of purchase 
certificates is the only key to open this door, then the price paid for such a 
purchase certifIcate represents - at least partly - an economic rent for those 
traders who have the ability to bypass existing impediments. Such economic 
rents are not inherent in the tripartite purchase by means of purchase certifi-
cates, but they are a specifIc type of transaction costs of the distribution system 
which restricts the access of private consumers to wholesalers by legal means. 
In a system in which consumers have free access to wholesalers, the argument 
that purchases by means of purchase certifIcates are automatically less favor-
able than purchases from retailers cannot be valid. The buyer possesses differ-
ent options as to where to acquire the information about his optimal source for 
purchases; the purchase certificate is simply one of these options. The buyer 
will only make use of it if it is more favorable than the other options, e.g. 
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information from consumer consultants, public media, or wholesalers them-
selves. The real issue is the reliability of the information conveyed by such 
purchase certificates. But that in turn presupposes a legal provision preventing 
deception of consumers, not a per se rule. 
7.7 Result 
The result of this analysis is that, on balance, transaction costs have been added 
to the distribution system by the introduction of Sec. 6a and 6b UWG. Thus 
in fact both provisions seek to conserve traditional trade structures and are 
transaction-cost-creating devices. 
In consequence, it could merely be recognized that those affected by the 
structural change in the distribution system have managed to create certain new 
transaction costs and thus to slow down the pace of structural change. But as 
has been mentioned above, both provisions are a battlefield with retailers' 
associations on one side and wholesalers - especially cash and carry wholesalers 
- on the other side. The reason for such conflict is very simple: both provisions 
are interpreted at present in such a way as to force any wholesaler to confine 
his activities to what is called "truly functional wholesale trade"; violations of 
that principle are seen by some authors (BAUMBACH and HEFERMEHL [1983], 
§6a note 12; FEZER [1976], GERSTENBERG [1976], WEIHENMEYER [1975], WILKE 
[1977]) arising in cases in which cash and carry wholesalers sell goods to 
commercial and institutional buyers who acquire goods for their private use 
goods which are not specific to their business. 
In these cases Sec. 6 b UWG will apply to the type of customers' identity 
cards issued by cash and carry wholesalers to their commercial and institutional 
customers to prevent private consumers from obtaining access to their markets. 
This interpretation has been criticized by both lawyers and economists 
(LEHMANN [1978], PFAFF [1977], SCHRICKER [1975, 1979], SCHRICKER and 
LEHMANN [1976], and GRONER and KOHLER [1986]). If transaction cost analysis 
is applied to these extensive interpretations of Sec. 6a par. 2 and 6b UWG, one 
realizes that very considerable new transaction costs are created: control mech-
anisms installed in order to distinguish betwen different types of sales according 
to type of business classifications cause transaction costs as such, transaction 
costs for the customers (the necessity to search for the second best source for 
puchases) and transaction costs for the wholesale trade, because the restriction 
to certain type of sales means rising distribution costs due to less favorable scale 
economies. 
This discussion oflegal interpretations of Sec. 6 a par. 2 and 6 b UWG shows 
that the transaction-cost-creating potential of both provisions is much greater 
than expected. If this extensive interpretation is gradually broadened, the over-
all effect will be to eliminate those types of wholesalers who do business on a 
cash and carry basis. Structural change of the distribution system could thus 
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not only be stopped but the wheel of structural change could even be turned 
backwards. 
Unfair competition law in Germany has created considerable transaction 
costs within the distribution system and has slowed down structural change. 
But as statutory law it is not a fIxed set of rules but rather a basis for the 
creation of case law evolving according to certain principles of interpretation; 
the real transaction-cost-creating potential of these two provisions is a matter 
oflegal reasoning. It has been shown that false economic rationales have played 
a role in the deVelopment of unfair competition law and that transaction cost 
analysis may refIne and correct this line of argument. 
8. Conclusion 
The application of transaction cost analysis to the phenomenon of structural 
change in the distribution system has helped to determine factors which are 
relevant for such structural change. On the other hand, it has become evident 
that there are decisive institutional restrictions. The detailed analysis oftransac-
tion costs due to legal provisions in the fIeld of unfair competition law has 
brought to light the very considerable economic impact of unfair competition 
law clauses which at fIrst seem to be irrelevant. And it has become clear that 
not only statutory law, but also principles which guide the legal interpretation 
of such norms, operate to create transaction costs. Economic reasoning has 
played a major role in the development of statutory law and its interpretation. 
Transaction cost analysis may add to the understanding of the economic func-
tioning of law and provide a tool for criticizing the conventional wisdom which 
has for long held the field in this area. Thus economic analysis may itself be a 
factor relevant for strategic options of the actors involved. It has to be seen 
whether such a new approach can play a role in the ongoing struggle about 
issues of the interpretation of unfair competition law. In the light of the existing 
difficulties in law and economics understanding one another's approach one 
might be sceptical as to the actual results. But this should not blur the picture 
as to the usefulness of refming the institutional approach in economics by even 
applying transaction cost analysis to various interpretations of existing legal 
provisions. 
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by 
THRAlNN EGGERTSSON 
The paper by KIRCHNER and PICOT [1987] deals with the interesting question of 
how the evolution of organizational form is constrained by statutory law and 
by the courts' interpretation of existing law. I agree with the authors' conclu-
sions that sections 6a and 6b of the West German unfair-competition legis-
lation are likely to create inefficiencies in the country's trade sector, and that 
the argument which says the legislation protects the consumer in some way has 
no basis in economic theory. My comments deal with various aspects of the 
authors' application of economic analysis, particularly transaction cost eco-
nomics, to the form of organization in the trade sector. 
In a laissez-faire market, the organizational form which minimizes the cost 
of producing and distributing a commodity to the final consumer, while cover-
ing all costs, is the one that survives (ALCHIAN [1950]). Total cost to the final 
consumer includes production costs and transaction costs of the agents who 
produce and distribute the commodity and the consumer's own transaction and 
production costs. Transportation is an example of a consumer's production 
costs. 
The authors concentrate their discussion on the impact of the legal system on 
transaction costs. I find their focus too narrow: the constraints imposed by the 
legal system influence the choice of organizational form and, through that 
choice, affect both production and transaction costs. 
The concept of transaction costs is among the most valuable recent additions 
to economic theory. However, it is still a concept that many economists have 
difficulty accepting. Perhaps the dichotomy production costs and transaction 
costs, and the corresponding division of activities into production and transac-
tions, is not as useful as it seems. Production costs hail from the traditional 
neoclassical model with its assumption of full information. Transaction costs 
appear when we allow for the cost of information. It is clear that transaction 
costs appear at every point in the production process - within the firm we 
sometimes refer to these costs as agency costs. Might it be more useful to follow 
the neoclassical tradition and state the analysis more in terms of production: 
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the production of information, the production of contractual agreements, the 
production of distributional services, the production of consumer satisfaction, 
and so on? The discussion in the paper sometimes gave me the feeling, probably 
unintended by the authors, that the trade sector was not engaged in production, 
and production costs were associated with material production. 
The organizational change which the empirical component of the paper 
examines is vertical integration in the West-German trade sector. It is argued 
that legal measures which block spontaneous vertical integration are inherently 
inefficient. The modern literature on vertical integration is essentially in agree-
ment with this conclusion, provided the fIrms in question operate in unfettered, 
competitive markets (WARRREN-BoULTON [1978]). However, interference by 
government in competitive markets can create incentives to bypass taxes, regu-
lations and price controls through vertical integration, and integration moti-
vated by such factors need not be an efficient move. With growing involvement 
of government in markets, perverse incentives are pervasive. I presume that 
vertical integration in the West-German trade sector is not an unintended effect 
of government intervention, such as taxation. 
Opportunities to monopolize trade sometimes act as incentives for vertical 
integration. The new industrial organization has taught us that various forms 
of vertical control, which until recently were seen as wasteful monopolistic 
practices, are efficient forms of organization which are required to protect 
specialized assets, and appropriable quasi-rents (KLEIN, CRAWFORD and 
ALCHIAN [1978], WILLIAMSON [1975]). Still, I am surprised that the opponents 
of vertical integration in the German trade sector have not put more emphasis 
on the evils of monopoly. I am unfamiliar with German law, but is the anti-trust 
legislation a less effective tool for special interest groups to manipulate than the 
unfair competition law? 
NELSON [1970] introduced the distinction between search goods and experi-
ence goods. The quality of search goods can be determined by inspection prior 
to purchase, but the quality of experience goods can only be established in the 
process of consumption - one example is canned tuna fIsh, and durable con-
sumer goods often have characteristics of experience goods. Nelson argued that 
"Limitations on consumer information about quality have profound effects 
upon the market structure of consumer goods." He sought to show that the 
market for experience goods has other structural characteristics than the mar-
ket for search goods, for example with respect to location of retail outlets and 
the optimal composition of inventories. My impression is that the incentives for 
the structural changes in the German trade sector, which are being blocked by 
sections 6a and 6b, namely direct contacts between wholesalers or producers 
and consumers, is consistent with a growing role of experience goods in the 
market for consumer goods, which in turn may be related to an increase for 
consumers in the relative price of time. In general, an increase in the relative 
price of time is consistent with many of the reasons given by the authors for 
structural changes in the trade sector. 
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The parties who maintain that wholesalers should not be allowed to deal 
directly with consumers rest their case on a twofold argument: first, the total 
cost to consumers of a commodity, when they deal directly with a wholesaler, 
is equal or higher than the total cost of the same commodity when it is bought 
from a conventional retailer, and second, consumers prefer to deal with whole-
salers only because the name wholesale signals wholesale prices which are 
usually lower than retail prices. This argument is not very convincing. It sug-
gests that there are extraordinarily high costs of acquiring information about 
market prices, whereas it seems more likely that information about prices in 
cash-and-carry markets and other wholesale outlets relative to prices in conven-
tional retail stores would spread. A somewhat more sophisticated case could be 
made by arguing that there were subtle differences in product quality between 
wholesale and retail outlets which goes unnoticed by consumers because infor-
mation about quality is more expensive than information about prices. 
My final comment relates to an interesting discussion by the authors of 
whether the welfare of consumers is necessarily increased if the state effectively 
prevents the spread by business of misleading and deceptive information. 
The authors assume that the ban of false advertising can have one of two 
consequences: a) business supplies correct information, and the search and 
experience costs of consumers are reduced, or b) business reacts by supplying 
no information at all,and the ban on deceptive information, therefore, has no 
effect on consumer welfare. I am not quite sure that I agree: if alternative b) 
is somehow the profit-maximizing response of business to the ban, I find it 
hard to see how one could generally assume that the welfare of consumers is 
unaffected. According to the authors, outcome b) forces consumers to generate 
their own information, and rely on specialized information agencies. Before the 
law against deceptive information, the consumer acquired information, at least 
partly, by filtering inforn1ation provided by producers and distributors. In the 
case of experience goods, as NELSON (1974) points out, the very fact that a 
producer spends large sums advertising his brand is a valuable piece of infor-
mation for the buyer. If prior to the ban the consumer's optimal strategy for 
collecting information involved testing data from this source, the elimination 
of that data has increased the cost of information to the consumer and reduced 
his welfare, rather than left him intact. 
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Transaction Cost Analysis of Structural Changes 
in the Distribution System: Reflections on Institutional 
Developments in the Federal Republic of Germany 
Comment 
by 
WOLFGANG BALLWIESER 
It is rather needless to say that KIRCHNER and PICOT [1987] have given us a 
very interesting and stimulating paper. Their analysis of the transaction cost-
minimizing function of the distribution system is intelligent and novel. With the 
exception of the pioneering, though somewhat different work of WILLIAMSON 
[1979] and Chapter Seven of GUMBEL'S new book [1985], where the discussion 
also has a different aim, Kirchner's and Picot's analysis is - to my knowledge 
- the first that has been presented. Hence it is with the best of reasons that their 
paper can be called novel. Perhaps it should be also noted that such a fruitful 
cooperation between a professor oflaw and a professor of business administra-
tion, as it demonstrates, cannot be observed very often, although it is' very 
desirable. 
I will not misuse my function to read a new paper nor would I find it 
worth while merely to sing the praises of their paper. The discussion will perhaps 
be given the greatest stimulus if I immediately pick out some problems which 
seem to me to deserve more attention than they have found in the paper. First, 
let me give you a summary of those problems. They relate to 
(1) the efficiency concept that underlies the paper of Picot and Kirchner, 
(2) the exact content or meaning and implication of what is called structural 
change, 
(3) the completeness of the transaction cost analysis when it has been used to 
deny any sense to Sec. 6a and b of the Unfair Competition Act, and, last 
but not least, 
(4) the ability to quantify those cost components which seemed to be relevant 
to the authors by means of a priori reasoning or empirical research results. 
Let us start with the efficiency concept that underlies the paper. It seems 
merely common sense to say that efficiency is a term which must be defined in 
a theoretical model. But the model, especially one feature of it, has not been 
explicitly formulated. That relevant feature is the time horizon, which could 
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have an important implication for an argument which has been advanced in the 
last part of the paper concerning the economic rationale for strictly separating 
wholesaling and retailing (Section 7.6). 
Efficiency has been used in the sense of cost minimization, where cost has a 
very broad meaning. In the first part of the paper the analysis has been con-
ducted with respect to a particular firm. But when the deletion of Sec. 6 a and 
6b of the Unfair Competition Act is proposed, the consequences for the pro-
ductive and pricing decisions of producers and traders must also be considered, 
which means that the partial analysis must give way to a general analysis. The 
term "cost" must be related to the overall economy; in this instance, it is 
necessary to define the precise meaning of cost minimization. At this point, it 
is unnecessary to stress the fact that it may be very difficult to estimate some 
of the transaction costs components. Rather, it must be pointed out that cost 
minimization needs the explication of a time horizon. This time horizon is not 
clear in the paper. 
To clarify this point further, assume that Sec. 6a and 6b UWG are deleted 
from the Unfair Competition Act without any replacement. Then, as Kirchner 
and Picot have shown, consumers can buy from the wholesaler or the retailer, 
the set of contracting partners can be widened and the information and/or 
contracting costs of the consumers will perhaps be reduced. Competition 
between wholesalers and retailers will be intensified. A large number of retailers 
could be driven from the market if the wholesalers are able to sell goods for a 
sufficiently long period at prices which are not high enough to compensate 
the costs of the retailers. The price reduction (on average) will of course be 
appreciated by the consumers - but perhaps only in the short run. If the 
elimination of Sec. 6 a and b leads to a different concentration process com-
pared to the case where 6a and 6b are not deleted, some assumption must be 
made as to the behavior of the distributing firms within that concentrated 
market. Cost minimization must be defined in the context ofthis concentration 
process. Is it really correct to assume that fierce competition within the trade 
will solve for us the long run cost minimization problem? I am unable to 
provide you with an answer which will still all doubt; I would feel more 
comfortable if there were some empirical arguments available which can show 
that the probability that competition can be expected to persist is high. 
In addition to the problem of efficiency, I am unsure as to what precise 
meaning has been attached to the phrase "structural change" which is or - more 
carefully - may be the basis for the reorganization of the distribution system. 
Structural change must mean the changing of those five factors which influence 
transaction costs; those factors have been specified and explained by Kirchner 
and Picot and it is not necessary to repeat them here. But I must confess that 
although I have gone over the paper several times, I could not detect a unique 
direction of change, with one important exception. That exception can be found 
in Section 5; where it is said that contact between producers and consumers is 
more feasible today than in the past. Furthermore, it is argued that traditional 
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barriers between wholesale and retail have become obsolete because of the 
determinants discussed before. But this result has not been proven. 
For example, it has been said that the production of standardized goods is 
increasing as technical developments take place and some branches have been 
named in which this is the case. But at the same time, it has been mentioned that 
products with less standardized characteristics and high demand in personal 
consulting are also enforced (Section 5). Or take another factor. New commu-
nication technologies allow better communication between producers, traders, 
and consumers. Some advantages may plausibly be said to accrue to large-scale 
traders in using these technologies. All this seems to be correct. But does that 
mean that personal consulting as a whole will be diminished on average, or does 
it merely mean that traditional small-scale traders are seeking and developing 
opportunities of engaging in the trade in those products where their advantage 
will still be preserved: the advantage that can be traced to personal consulting 
capacities with which no computer can compete? 
Or take the last factor: joint demand for goods. The joint demand is the 
better the less time a consumer has, for it reduces the frequency of purchasing 
and the number of contacting and contracting activities. On the other hand, it 
. must be considered that those traders who allow joint demand are very often 
located outside the cities, which means that purchasers have to use their own 
cars, must sometimes park their cars a good distance from the market, and have 
to wait a long time until they can pay. Taken together, all this means that the 
cost per contacting and contracting unit will have risen. In addition, is it really 
possible to say that the joint demand for goods is now more often observable? 
Is it not compensated for by an other-directed process which has been in-
fluenced by the argument that one should use the streetcar or the subway 
instead of one's own car, or by the argument that the act of purchasing can be 
used to make the social contacts which are facilitated by small-scale traders? It 
may be helpful to remind the American colleagues present that shopping is very 
different in the United States and in Germany with respect to the acceptance 
of markets located on the outskirts of the city. In addition, it may be noted that 
an argument based on the value of social contacts is of course excluded by an 
efficiency concept based on cost minimization. 
To repeat the point once again: structural change has been used to show that 
flexibility within the distribution system is needed. But I would also like to 
know whether structural change can be described in such a way that it has a 
direct implication for the discussion of Sec. 6a and 6b of the Unfair Competi-
tion Act. 
The third problem I want to stress is the question as to whether Kirchner's 
and Picot's discussion of transaction costs is completed. I do not have any 
doubt that this is the case when I look at the first part of the paper. My problem 
arises with respect to the second part of it, where I have gained the impression 
that the information and contracting costs of the consumers have dominated 
the discussion. I wonder whether there are significant information costs of 
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producers which could be lower if the distribution system is indeed divided up 
into wholesaling and retailing traders. First of all, it should be mentioned that 
pursuing both activities simultaneously is not prohibited; what is prohibited is 
a wholesaler selling his products directly to a consumer. Besides this, there 
could be special advantages to a producer if the retailers are able to acquire 
more and/or better information about consumers' preferences than whole-
salers. This could be especially the case when new products are being intro-
duced into the market or when the standardization of a product is not possible 
or not desirable. But it could be even the case when' a standardized product is 
offered, since the retailers may offer a set of competing products which differs 
from that offered by a wholesaler and may gain some information about the 
competitive advantage or disadvantage which differs from that gained by the 
wholesalers. It could be asked why such information relevant to the producer 
may be better produced by retailers than by wholesalers, since in principle the 
latter group could also gain the information. One simple answer could be that 
the retailers have more personal staff to communicate with the customers. 
A consequence of this argument would be that a weighing of consumers' 
information costs is too narrow and that an elimination of Sec. 6a and 6b of 
the Unfair Competition Act could imply a rise in the information costs of 
producers when the distribution structure is changed in such a way that a large 
number of the retailers cannot survive. Of course, I am fully aware of the 
problem that the arguments I have advanced are speCUlative and a priori. My 
knowledge does not go far enough to enable me to say precisely how firms 
reduce in practice the gaps about consumer preferences. 
This leads me to the last problem which deserves attention. I find the transac-
tion cost analysis of institutions a challenging and very promising way of 
obtaining a better understanding of these institutions. But what I do miss up 
to now is the forging of a connection between a priori reasoning with empirical 
results, especially the attempt to quantify the components of transaction costs. 
I know that this problem is not unique to transaction cost analysis. Nor should 
my remark be misunderstood as a criticism of Christian Kirchner and Arnold 
Picot for not themselves having done this quantitative analysis. That would 
demand a totally new research project. Nevertheless I would like to know 
whether there are empirical results which may be taken to improve still further 
the - as a whole - outstanding quality of their arguments. 
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